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This Article summarizes and discusses important developments in West 
Virginia oil and gas law between July 1, 2017, and June 30, 2018. Part II of 
this Article will discuss common law developments in both state and 
federal courts in West Virginia and Part III will discuss statutory 
developments of enacted legislation. 
II. Judicial Developments 
First, this section will discuss the oil and gas cases decided by the West 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Second, it will examine a decision 
issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of West 
Virginia that was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit. 
A. West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
L&D Investments, Inc. v. Mike Ross, Inc. 
On May 22, 2018, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals issued 
its ruling in L&D Investments, Inc. v. Mike Ross, Inc., addressing the 
validity of a duplicate tax deed and the effect of the three-year statute of 
limitations regarding delinquent tax sales for voidable deeds.
1
 Starting in 
1903, multiple parties created multiple real property tax assessments for 
two contiguous tracts of land, including an assessment entered under one 
name for an undivided 100 percent interest in the oil and gas—referred to 
as the “master assessment.”
2
 At the same time, other parties created 
separate real property tax assessments for undivided interests in the same 
oil and gas that was already covered by the master assessment; this scenario 
is not uncommon in West Virginia.
3
 All of the taxes levied under these 
various assessments were paid until 2000, when the taxes due and owing 
under the master assessment were not paid and it became delinquent.
4
 In 
2003, the tax lien associated with the master assessment was sold and 
ultimately a tax deed was issued to Mike Ross, Inc. (“MRI”) for the oil and 
gas interest associated with the delinquent master assessment.
5
 Eventually, 
litigation ensued over the true ownership of the oil and gas interests and the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. L&D Investments, Inc. v. Mike Ross, Inc., No. 17-0325, 2018 WL 2405989 (W. Va. 
May 22, 2018). 
 2. Id. at *3. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
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proper payment of royalties for the oil and gas produced from the land.
6
 
The Circuit Court of Harrison County concluded that the tax deed to MRI 
was valid because the owners of the separately assessed interests had failed 
to pay the taxes due and owing under the master assessment, which had 
included their interests.
7
 Moreover, the circuit court determined that the 
owners of the separately assessed interests could not challenge the validity 




On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the 
circuit court’s decision and ruled in favor of the owners of the separately 
assessed interests, reiterating the Court’s holding in State v. Allen
9
 where 
the Court had held that “[i]n [a] case of two assessments of the same 
land[,] . . . one payment of taxes under either assessment is all the state can 
require.”
10
 The Court found, contrary to the circuit court’s ruling, and albeit 
through a complicated set of facts, that the owners of the separately 
assessed interests had continually paid the taxes assessed under their 
separate assessments, even after the master assessment was sold as 
delinquent.
11
 Because the oil and gas owners had paid the taxes owed under 
the separate assessments, the master assessment tax deed was void, and 
thus, the statute of limitations, which only applies to voidable tax sale 




 protects voidable deeds, not deeds that 
are void—which have no statute of limitations.
14
 Accordingly, the Court 
remanded the case to the circuit court.
15
 
Gastar Exploration Inc. v. Rine 
On October 19, 2017, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
issued its opinion in Gastar Exploration, Inc. v. Rine, in which the Court 
determined that a reservation of one-half of the oil and gas was ambiguous 
and that it was appropriate to consider extrinsic evidence to determine the 
parties’ intent.
16
 In 1957, the Franklins, who owned a tract of land in fee, 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Id. at *4. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. State v. Allen, 64 S.E. 140 (W. Va. 1909). 
 10. L&D, 2018 WL 2405989, at *6 (citing Allen, 64 S.E. at 140). 
 11. Id. at *7-8. 
 12. Id. at *8. 
 13. W. VA. CODE ANN § 11A-4-4 (West 2018). 
 14. L&D, 2018 WL 2405989, at *8. 
 15. Id. at *9. 
 16. Gastar Expl. Inc. v. Rine, 806 S.E.2d 448, 454-58 (W. Va. 2017). 
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sold the tract to the Yohos, but they reserved one-half of the oil and gas.
17
 
For the next twenty years, the tax assessments reflected that the Franklins 
owned an undivided one-half interest in the oil and gas and that the 
remaining undivided one-half interest in the oil and gas, as well as the 
surface, were owned by the Yohos.
18
 In 1977, the Yohos conveyed “the 
same property” to the McCardles by means of a deed that included the 
identical reservation language that was used in the 1957 deed.
19
 After 1977, 
the Yohos were not assessed for any taxes on the surface for the oil and gas, 
but their former assessment was transferred to the McCardles, who 
proceeded to pay the assessed taxes for over 30 years.
20
 After Ms. 
McCardle signed an oil and gas lease with Gastar Exploration in 2008, the 
Yoho heirs—through their estate administrator Gary Rine—filed a 
complaint, asserting that the Yohos had not conveyed their interest in the 
oil and gas to the McCardles.
21
 Initially, the Circuit Court of Marshall 
County decided that the 1977 deed was unambiguous and that the Yohos 




On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed and 
remanded the case, holding that the circuit court erred in finding the 1977 
deed as unambiguous.
23
 In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted the 
longstanding contract rule that if a deed is ambiguous on its face, a court 
must look to extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent—including the parties’ 
conduct “before and after” delivery of the deed.
24
 Furthermore, the Court 
noted that a deed will be rendered ambiguous if reasonable minds might 
disagree as to its meaning.
25
 In this case, the deed was poorly drafted and 
reasonable minds could disagree as to exactly what had been conveyed, 
particularly because the deed contained no expressed intentions by the 
Yohos regarding the one-half oil and gas reservation.
26
 The Court 
interpreted the ambiguous language in favor of the grantee, in part because 
of the canons of construction that favor the grantee over the grantor in the 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Id. at 452. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 453. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 457. 
 24. Id. at 455. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 456. 
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interpretation of an ambiguous conveyance, as well as the conduct of the 
parties after the delivery of the deed, specifically the fact that the 




B. Federal Courts 
EQT Production Company v. Wender 
On August 30, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit issued its ruling in EQT Prod. Co. v. Wender, which concerned 
whether a county ordinance could prohibit an injection well operator from 
disposing of wastewater within the county in spite of the fact that state and 
federal laws permitted such wastewater disposal.
28
 Under the West Virginia 
Oil and Gas Act (“O&G Act”),
29
 the West Virginia Department of 
Environmental Protection is broadly responsible for regulating and 
permitting oil and gas wells.
30
 Under the O&G Act, disposal wells are also 
subject to permit requirements of federal laws,
31
 including the Safe 
Drinking Water Act (“SDW Act”).
32
 Pursuant to the applicable laws, the 
injection well operator obtained permits for a single disposal well in Fayette 
County, West Virginia.
33
 On January 12, 2016, the Fayette County 
Commission enacted a ban on disposal wells which prohibited the “storage, 
treatment, injection, processing or permanent disposal” of wastewater in 
Fayette County, West Virginia.
34
 The injection well operator challenged the 
county ordinance in federal court; the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of West Virginia held that the county ban was preempted 
by the state’s permit program and granted summary judgment in the 
injection well operator’s favor.
35
 Additionally, the district court 
permanently enjoined the ban and the county appealed.
36
 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed the judgment of the district court in all respects.
37
 In West 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Id. 
 28. EQT Prod. Co. v. Wender, 870 F.3d 322, 325 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 29. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-6-2 et seq. (West 2018). 
 30. EQT, 870 F.3d at 325. 
 31. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-4-7.2 (West 2018). 
 32. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300f (West 2018). 
 33. EQT, at 327. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 329. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 337. 
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Virginia, county commissions only have the limited powers granted to them 
by the West Virginia Constitution and by the West Virginia Legislature, 
which makes the county’s legislative powers subordinate to acts of the 
West Virginia Legislature.
38
 In this case, the county’s ban on disposal wells 
was inconsistent with the state’s statutory authorization of disposal wells. 
The county argued that the Legislature had delegated authority to it to enact 
ordinances to abate pollution.
39
 However, like the district court, the Fourth 
Circuit disagreed.
40
 Furthermore, the Court noted that it did not need to 
decide the question of federal preemption under the SDW Act because of 
the state preemption.
41
 Ultimately, the Court found no error on the part of 
the district court and affirmed that inconsistencies with county ordinances 
against state statutes must be resolved in favor of the state.
42
 
III. Statutory Developments 
The 83rd West Virginia Legislature completed its second regular session 
on March 10, 2018. In total, 1,778 bills were introduced, 260 of which were 
sent to the Governor for his signature, and three will primarily affect the oil 
and gas industry. 
Senate Bill 360 
First, Senate Bill 360 clarified the legislature’s intent pertaining to W. 
Va. Code § 22-6-8 and abrogated the holding of the West Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals in Leggett v. EQT Prod Co.
43
 The legislature answered 
the challenge set forth in the majority and concurring opinions in Leggett to 
“enact specific provisions to assure fairness and reasonableness in the 
calculation of post-production costs.”
44
 Previously, W. Va. Code § 22-6-
8(e) provided that working interest owners were to pay mineral owners 
royalties of no less than one-eighth of the total amount received for flat-rate 
wells.
45
 Yet, the minimum royalty statute was interpreted in Leggett to 
mean that royalties for flat-rate leases could be calculated using a “net-
                                                                                                                 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 333-34. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 332. 
 42. Id. at 337. 
 43. S.B. 360, 83d Leg., Reg Sess. (W. Va. 2018); Leggett v. EQT Prod. Co., 800 S.E.2d 
850 (W. Va. 2017). 
 44. Leggett, 800 S.E.2d at 869 (Workman, J., concurring). 
 45. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-6-8(e) (West 2018) (amended 2018). 
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back” or “work-back” method—which permitted deductions for post-
production costs in calculating the royalties.
46
 
The statute has now been amended to more clearly state that on flat-rate 
leases, mineral owners shall be paid a royalty of no less than one-eighth “of 
the gross proceeds, free from any post-production expenses.”
47
 The law 
took effect on May 31, 2018, but a lawsuit has been filed challenging the 
constitutionality of the amended statute.
48
 
House Bill 4268 
Second, House Bill 4268, named the “Co-Tenancy Modernization and 
Majority Protection Act,” eased the West Virginia rule that had 
characterized oil and gas production by only some, but not all, of cotenants 
as waste.
49
 The previous law, which required consent, usually by means of 
obtaining an oil and gas lease, from one-hundred percent of the owners of 
the oil and gas in a given tract prior to drilling a well,
50
 set West Virginia 
apart from other oil-and-gas-producing states by greatly limiting the options 
for exploration and production companies. Given the long history of 
mineral severances, and the frequency of highly fractionated mineral 
ownership, acquiring consent from all of the co-tenants in the development 
of oil or natural gas often proved very difficult and sometimes impossible. 
The new law, which took effect on June 3, 2018, established a mechanism 




Now, in situations where the oil and gas is owned by seven or more 
cotenants and at least seventy-five percent of the ownership has consented 
to development, the oil and gas can be lawfully developed, even over the 
objection of the non-consenting minority of owners.
52
 Once the thresholds 
are met, a non-consenting co-tenant must choose to either (1) receive a pro 
rata share of the royalty—free from post-production deductions—at the 
highest rate to be received by a consenting co-tenant or (2) participate in the 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Leggett, 800 S.E.2d at 868. 
 47. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-6-8(e) (West 2018). 
 48. Brad McElhinny, EQT Sues WV Government Over New Royalties Law, METRO 
NEWS (Apr. 14, 2018, 6:35 AM), http://wvmetronews.com/2018/04/14/eqt-sues-wv-
government-over-new-royalties-law/. 
 49. H.B. 4268, 83d Leg., Reg Sess. (W. Va. 2018). 
 50. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-7-2 (West 2018) (amended 2018). 
 51. See H.B. 4268, 83d Leg., Reg Sess. (W. Va. 2018). 
 52. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37B-1-4(a) (West 2018). 
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development of the tract.
53
 The bill also contains provisions protecting 
unknown or missing owners
54
 and prohibiting surface disturbance.
55
  
House Bill 4270 
Third, House Bill 4270,
56
 referred to as the “Check Stub Bill,” provides 
greater uniformity and transparency to mineral owners for royalty 
payments.
57
 The new law, which took effect on June 8, 2018, now requires 
oil and gas producers to disclose certain information to royalty owners—
such as API well numbers, amounts of oil or gas produced, and prices for 
each product sold.
58
 The bill also requires timely payments of royalties and 




                                                                                                                 
 53. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37B-1-4(b) (West 2018). 
 54. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37B-1-5 (West 2018). 
 55. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37B-1-6 (West 2018). 
 56. H.B. 4270, 83d Leg., Reg Sess. (W. Va. 2018).  
 57. Rusty Marks, Check Stub Bill Requires Accurate Reporting of Oil and Gas 
Royalties, WV NEWS (Apr. 2, 2018). https://www.wvnews.com/news/wvnews/check-stub-
bill-requires-accurate-reporting-of-oil-and-gas/article_e9c98e82-73f6-5a52-9859-
bffa48f8b442.html. 
 58. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37C-1-1 (West 2018). 
 59. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37C-1-3 (West 2018). 
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